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THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN COMPLEX LITIGATION
The American legal system inherited from the English common
law a simplistic rule defining the right to trial by jury in civil ac-
tions: in legal actions there is such a right, while in suits in equity
there is not.' The English rule is embodied in the seventh amend-
ment, which secures the right to trial by jury in legal actions.2 This
amendment has been interpreted to preserve the right to jury trial
as it existed in English common law as of 1791. This peculiar histori-
cal background is relevant to the interpretation of the seventh
amendment because the existence of an adequate legal remedy, and
thus the availability of a legal action and a jury trial, are deter-
mined by historical analysis.3
The introduction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure4 in 1938
and the resulting merger of law and equity in the federal courts5
upset this historical approach. Supreme Court decisions after the
enactment of the Federal Rules declared that the Rules expanded
legal remedies, thus narrowing the scope of equity.' The courts,
therefore, must consider the effect of the Federal Rules, as well as
historical factors, before labeling an action as legal or equitable.
This ruling on the nature of the action then settles the issue whether
the right to trial by jury attaches.7
The availability of the right to trial by jury has been especially
troublesome in the area of complex litigation. At common law, juris-
diction over complex cases rested in the courts of law and equity
concurrently;8 the adequacy of the remedy at law determined
whether the proceeding was brought properly at law or in equity.'
1. See 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.11[2] (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE'S]; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92 (3d ed. 1976).
2. "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see FED. R. Civ.
P. 38(a), which states: "The right to trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties
inviolate." Id.
3. See 5 MOORE'S, supra note 1, 38.1115]-[7]; C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 92.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
6. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539-42 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,
478 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-10 (1959).
7. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 459 U.S. 500, 506-10 (1959).
8. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 442 (9th ed. 1866).
9. Id. §§ 442-43.
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But the merger of law and equity, which made equitable procedures
available to courts of law,'0 has widened the scope of adequate legal
remedies. Moreover, complex litigation today bears little resembl-
ance to the complicated cases at common law. Today's cases involve
large numbers of plaintiffs and defendants," counterclaims" and
cross-claims,'3 documents, witnesses, exhibits,'4 and technical facts,
causing trials to last several months15 and to adversely affect both
the parties involved and our system of judicial administration.
This increased complexity and the merger of law and equity by
the Federal Rules have had a subsfantial impact on the concept of
concurrent jurisdiction, as documented in two Supreme Court deci-
sions, Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 8 and Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood.'7 A subsequent decision, Ross v. Bernhard,' apparently has
eliminated the procedural impediments of the historical approach
by authorizing a case-by-case determination of whether the jury can
handle the issues involved in the litigation."' Following an examina-
tion of the historical background of complex litigation, this Note
concludes that the Ross test should be interpreted strictly, accord-
ing to Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, and that courts should
examine sympathetically, at every stage of the litigation, factors
that would support the adequacy of the remedy at law. 20 Following
this will be a discussion of ways to reduce the complexity of modern
litigation.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The preservation of the right to a jury trial in both the seventh
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
11. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re U.S.
Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 706 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
12. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 64.
13. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. at 706.
14. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 63; In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litiga-
tion, 75 F.R.D. at 707; Jones v. Orenstein, 73 F.R.D. 604, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
15. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 63; In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litiga-
tion, 75 F.R.D. at 713.
16. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
17. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
18. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
19. Id. at 538 n.10: see text accompanying notes 100-187 infra.
20. The justification for the bias toward jury trial, see Ross 396 U.S. at 551 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting), lies in the existence of a constitutional right to trial by jury and the lack of any
equivalent right to a nonjury trial. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. at 510.
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amendment and Federal Rule 38(a) suggests that the right should
be interpreted in the context of its historical origins. Until recently,
courts used only an historical-analogy test to determine whether the
right to a jury trial existed in a particular case.2' Although the
historical test is still valid, other factors now must be considered. 22
Thus, the proper starting point for an inquiry into the right to trial
by jury in complex litigation is examination of the practice at com-
mon law.
Nonjury trials in complex litigation began in England with the
common law action for an accounting, arising from a relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant which imposed on the de-
fendant the obligation to account.? Although the account was one
of the most ancient forms of action at common law, 24 the equity
courts gradually superseded the common law courts in this area.,
Despite periodic attempts to revise them, those common law proce-
dures remained "very dilatory, inconvenient, and unsatisfactory. ' 2
Alternatively, equity procedures, such as discovery, joinder, inter-
pleader, and the class action, were better suited to complex litiga-
tion.27 Unlike the common law courts, which had to rely on outside
evidence if a party refused to present the documents in question,
2
the plaintiff in equity was entitled to discover the defendant's books
and papers. 29 Accordingly, the matter could be settled more effec-
tively.30 English case law supported equity jurisdiction in complex
litigation and recognized that, even if purely legal rights were in-
volved, the jurisdiction of equity was concurrent with that of the
law.3' Equity jurisdiction was invoked whenever the complicated
nature of the accounts and the unwieldy procedures of the courts of
21. See note 3 supra.
22. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10; Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. at 478;
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. at 506-07.
23. H. McCLINTocK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQurry § 200 (2d ed. 1948). The
relationships included situations in which the defendant was "plaintiff's bailiff, factor, part-
ner, or a receiver of money to the use of plaintiff." Id.
24. 1 J. STORY, supra note 8, § 442.
25. F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 63-4 (1954).
26. 1 J. STORY, supra note 8, § 442, at 416.
27. See D. KARLEN, CIVIL LITIGATION 217-20 (1978); 1 J. STORY, supra note 8, § 450.
28. 1 J. STORY, supra note 8, § 449.
29. Id. § 443.
30. Id. § 449 (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 164).
31. See, e.g., Shepard v. Brown, 4 Giff. 208, 66 Eng. Rep. 681 (1862); O'Connor v. Spaight,
1 Sch. & Lefr. 305, 309 (1804).
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law rendered the legal remedy inadequate.3" Thus, in case of concur-
rent jurisdiction, convenience was the main consideration. 3
Concurrent jurisdiction, however, was not limited to actions in
account. As early as 1603, Lord Egerton, in Clench v. Tomley, 3
denied a jury trial because the judge was better qualified to render
a decision than a jury of ploughmen, though the case involved the
interpretation of books and deeds. 5 In Wedderburn v. Pickering,3"
Master of the Rolls Jessel cited the "old" rule in Clarke v. Cookson 7
that some cases were too complex to be tried conveniently before a
jury." ' Thus, the English common law, invoking equity jurisdiction,
recognized that complex cases could exceed the jury's limitations,
thereby rendering the remedy at law inadequate.
This principle of the English common law was incorporated into
the American legal system. Alexander Hamilton believed that the
introduction of complex questions to a jury would undermine the
jury system.39 As early as 1831, the Supreme Court, following Ham-
ilton's theory and the English common law, recognized the English
concept of concurrent jurisdiction of equity courts with common law
courts in cases of great complexity.' The Court acknowledged eq-
uity's jurisdiction not only in actions -of account and in actions
involving a trustee, but also in cases in which the accounts were
32. See White v. Williams, 8 Ves. 193, 32 Eng.'Rep. 327 (1803).
33. Shepard v. Brown, 4 Giff. 208, 66 Eng. Rep. 681 (1862). "On questions of account,
Courts of Equity and Courts of law possess concurrent jurisdiction, and the decision as to
the proper tribunal must be governed by considerations of convenience." Id. at -, 66 Eng.
Rep. at 681.
34. 1 Cary 23. 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (1603).
35. Id.
36. 13 Ch. D. 769 (1879).
37. 2 Ch. D. 746 (1875).
38. 13 Ch. D. at 771; see 2 Ch. D. at 747-48.
39. A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 589 (H. Dawson ed. 1870). Hamilton stated,
[T]he circumstances that constitute cases proper for Courts of equity are in
many instances so nice and intricated, that they are incompatible with the
genius of trial by jury. They often require such long, deliberate and critical
investigation, as would be impracticable to men called from their occupations,
and obliged to decide before they were permitted to return to them. The sim-
plicity and expedition which form the distinguishing characters of this mode of
trial require, that the matter to be decided should be reduced to some single and
obvious point; while the litigations usually in Chancery, frequently compre-
hend a long train of minute and independent particulars.
Id. at 588-89.
40. Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 495 (1831).
[Vol. 20:329
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complex, the law imposed some difficulty, or the situation required
discovery."
In 1887, in Kirby v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad, 42
the Supreme Court dealt specifically with the capacity of jurors to
understand and decide complex cases. The dispute in Kirby con-
cerned a contract for more than 200 shipments of cattle and hogs
and over $350,000 in freight charges. 43 Although the Court stated
that the complicated nature of the accounts alone supplied the nec-
essary basis for equity jurisdiction, 4 it further determined that a
jury could not "unravel the transactions involved." The Court de-
cided that, under the circumstances, equitable procedures were re-
quired to achieve justice. 4 The approach, then, was to examine both
the complexity of the accounts and the limitations of the jury.46
The jurisdiction of equity in complex cases, however, was not
automatic. In Fowle v. Lawrason,41 the Court, though noting several
situations that warranted equity jurisdiction," cautioned that not
every case involving numerous transactions required concurrent ju-
risdiction. 49 Moreover, an even finer distinction was drawn in United
41. Id. at 503.
42. 120 U.S. 130 (1887).
43. Id. at 132.
44. Id. at 134.
45. Id.; see 1 J. STORY, supra note 8, § 451.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451, 475-76 (1906). The lower
federal courts also followed the English rule. In Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 143 F. 152 (C.C.D.N.J. 1906), the Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey noted
that even if the complainant had a remedy at law, equity jurisdiction was not precluded if
the remedy at law was not as practical and efficient as the remedy in equity. Id. at 159.
Characterizing the transactions in the case as complicated and intricate, the court found that
it would be well nigh impossible for a jury sitting in the ordinary way in a trial
at law to remember, consider, and digest the necessary evidence relating
thereto. It is not unreasonable to assume that the most patient, intelligent, and
fair-minded jury would, under the circumstances, fail to do justice between the
parties.
Id. For other lower court decisions recognizing concurrent jurisdiction in complicated cases,
see McNair v. Burt, 68 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1934); Balfour v. San Joaquin Valley Bank, 156 F.
500 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1906). The English common law standard of convenience was reflected
in the courts' analyses of practicality and efficiency. See, e.g., Hattiesburg Lumber Co. v.
Herrick, 212 F. 834 (5th Cir. 1914); Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 13
F.2d 633 (W.D. Ky. 1926).
47. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 495 (1831).
48. See note 41 supra & accompanying text.
49. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 502-03. The Court stated:
[lt cannot be admitted, that a court of equity may take cognisance of every
action, for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered, or of money ad-
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States v. Bitter Root Development Co.51 In 1906, the United States
brought an action to recover the value of certain timber alleged to
have been cut and taken wrongfully by the defendants .5 One of the
defendants formed various corporations in an attempt to make proof
of his involvement difficult.52 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the bill in equity on the ground that there
was an adequate remedy at law.5 The Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that mere difficulty of proof was not an adequate basis for
equity jurisdiction. 4 Furthermore, in the 1914 case of Curriden v.
Middleton,55 the Supreme Court noted that "mere complication of
facts alone and difficulty of proof are not a basis of equity jurisdic-
tion. "
In summary, although the older decisions seemed to be based on
discretion-" and convenience, 5 Bitter Root and Curriden established
that complicated facts and difficulty of proof alone were not suffi-
cient to invoke equity jurisdiction; rather, the determinative issue
was whether the case was sufficiently complicated to render the
remedy at law inadequate. The distinction, however, was unclear.
Although equity procedures were better suited to complicated cases
vanced, where partial payments have been made, or of every contract, express
or implied, consisting of various items, on which different sums of money have
become due and different payments have been made. Although the line may not
be drawn with absolute precision, yet it may be safely affirmed, that a court of
chancery cannot draw to itself every transaction between individuals in which
an account between parties is to be adjusted.
Id.
50. 200 U.S. 451 (1906).
51. Id. at 451.
52. Id. at 472.
53. United States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 133 F. 274, 281 (9th Cir. 1904).
54. United States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451, 472 (1906).
55. 232 U.S. 633 (1914).
56. Id. at 636. The district court in Goffe & Clarkener, Inc. v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d
801 (D. Kan. 1928). affl'd, 46 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1931), discussed thoroughly when equity
jurisdiction was proper in situations involving complicated accounts. 26 F.2d at 802-05. The
court found that there were three instances in which actions for an accounting in equity were
proper: (1) in cases of mutual accounts; (2) in cases of fiduciary relationships imposing a duty
to account, id. at 802: and (3) in cases when the accounts, even though only on one side, are
complicated or when securing adequate relief at law would be difficult. Id. at 803-04. The
court held that. given the facts presented, equity jurisdiction was proper because a jury
simply could not handle the "difficult, complicated and confusing" account. Id. at 801, 804-
05.
57. See, e.g., Balfour v. San Joaquin Valley Bank, 156 F. 500 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1906).
58. See, e.g., Shepard v. Brown, 4 Giff. 208, 66 Eng. Rep. 681 (1862).
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and jurors continued to have difficulty understanding complex
transactions, the field of cases properly committed to equity juris-
diction remained narrow. 59
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have had a significant im-
pact on the right to trial by jury in complex cases, primarily because
the Rules have expanded legal remedies, thereby limiting the scope
of equity jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has interpreted this im-
pact in three major cases."0 The first decision, Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover,6 did not deal specifically with complicated cases.
Beacon Theatres is important, however, because it was the first
consideration of the right to jury trial under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.2 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood63 involved complicated
accounts to which the Court applied the Beacon Theatres test.6 4 The
most recent decision, Ross v. Bernhard,5 set out a new test for
determining whether the right to trial by jury exists. The Ross test
contained a separate provision for complex cases."
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover
In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,67 the complaint sought a
declaratory judgment that certain practices were reasonable and for
an injunction to prevent the defendant from instituting an antitrust
action based on those practices." The defendant responded with a
counterclaim and a cross-claim alleging violations of the antitrust
laws and seeking treble damages and a jury trial. 9 The district court
ruled that the issues raised by the complaint, the counterclaim, and
59. See Goffe & Clarkener, Inc. v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d 801 (D. Kan. 1928), aff'd, 46
F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1831).
60. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962);
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
61. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
62. Id. at 506-11.
63. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
64. Id. at 472-73.
65. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). Ross did not involve complicated accounts but rather was a
stockholders' derivative suit. See notes 100-08 infra & accompanying text.
66. 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
67. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
68. Id. at 502-03.
69. Id. at 503.
1978] 335
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the cross-claim, including the question of competition between the
two parties, were essentially equitable. 70 Accordingly, the trial
court, acting under Federal Rules 42(b) and 57, directed that these
issues be tried by the court before the jury determined the alleged
antitrust violations.7'
The reasonableness of the practices in question depended, in part,
on the existence of competition between the two parties.7 The dis-
trict court had determined that the issue of competition was essen-
tially equitable. 73 The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit noted
that this action by the district court could have operated as a collat-
eral estoppel against the defendant as to the issue of the reasonable-
ness of the practices in question. The court of appeals held that
the trial court, acting under Federal Rule 42(b), did not abuse its
discretion in trying the equitable cause first even though that might
prevent a full jury trial on the issue of the reasonableness of the
practices. 75 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the separa-
tion of issues by the district court deprived the defendant of the
right to trial by jury."
Irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law historically
have been the basis of injunctive relief; the Court reasoned that at
least as much was to be required under the Federal Rules to allow
equitable claims to be tried before legal claims. 7  Whether the legal
remedy available was inadequate and and whether irreparable harm
was threatened could be determined only with reference to the rem-
70. Id. at 503-04.
71. Id. at 503. Rule 42(b), as amended in 1966, provides:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate
issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party
claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury declared
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the
United States.
FED. R. Crv. P. 42(b) (emphasis supplied to indicate the language added to the Rule after
the Beacon Theatres decision). Rule 57 reads, in pertinent part: "The court may order a
speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar."
FED. R. Civ. P. 57.
72. 359 U.S. at 503-04.
73. See note 70 supra & accompanying text.
74. 359 U.S. at 504.-
75. Id. at 505.
76. Id. at 506. 508. 511.
77. Id. at 506-07.
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edies made available by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the
Federal Rules.78 In view of these principles, and given the merger of
law and equity as reflected in Rules 1, 2, and 18, the Court con-
cluded that all of the issues in Beacon Theatres could be settled in
one trial.79
As to the general effect of the Federal Rules on jury and nonjury
trials, the Court noted that the purpose of the Rules was to reform
procedure while leaving substantive rights unchanged. 0 The Fed-
eral Rules and the Declaratory Judgment Act expanded the scope
of legal remedies;"1 because equity acted only if the remedy at law
was inadequate, this expansion narrowed the scope of equity. 2 Al-
though the Court stated that the trial court had discretion to invoke
equity jurisdiction if such action would better protect the plaintiff,8
its declaration that there is no constitutional right to trial by the
court similar to the right to trial by jury limited that discretion."
Therefore, the trial court's discretion "must, wherever possible, be
exercised to preserve jury trial."
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood
The Supreme Court recognized in Beacon Theatres that the Fed-
eral Rules had narrowed the scope of equity jurisdiction by expand-
ing legal remedies. The Court's emphasis on practicality suggested
78. Id.
79. Id. at 508. Before the merger of law and equity in the Federal Rules, subsequent legal
actions were enjoined because the legal actions may not have provided the plaintiff in equity
with a fair and orderly trial of the issues; therefore, the remedy at law was rendered inade-
quate. Id. at 507.
Rule 1 provides:
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits
of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty,
with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule 2 states: "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil
action.'" FED. R. Civ. P. 2. Rule 18(a) reads: "A party asserting a claim to relief as an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as
alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against an opposing
party." FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
80. 359 U.S. at 508-09; see 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970); FED. R. Civ. P. 39(a).
81. 359 U.S. at 509: see 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970); Id. § 2201.
82. 359 U.S. at 509.
83. Id. at 510.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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that, in addition to the joinder of equitable and legal claims in one
civil action, 6 other provisions of the Rules affected the scope of
equity.' The Court's decision in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood 8 sup-
ported this suggestion. Dairy Queen involved a breach of contract
action in which the plaintiff sought an accounting. The defendant
demanded a jury trial, but the trial judge struck this demand upon
motion by the plaintiff. Emphasizing its holding in Beacon
Theatres," the Supreme Court reversed.12 The Court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that, because the complaint sought an account-
ing and not damages, the action essentially was equitable;13 the
availability of a constitutional right did not turn upon the choice of
words in the pleading. 4 To prove the inadequacy of the legal rem-
edy, the plaintiff would have to show that the accounts were so
complicated that a jury could not unravel them.95
Although the Court found that the accounts were not sufficiently
complicated,98 it went a step further and declared in a footnote that
the procedural changes accomplished by the Federal Rules could
diminish the use of traditional equitable remedies even in cases
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 2, 18(a).
87. The Court concluded in Beacon Theatres that the existence of an inadequate remedy
and irreparable harm today "must be determined, not by precedents decided under discarded
procedures, but in the light of remedies now made available by the Declaratory Judgment
Act and the Federal Rules." 359 U.S. at 507.
88. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
89. Id. at 475.
90. Id. at 470: McCullough v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1961). The
defendant then sought mandamus in the Third Circuit, but this was denied without opinion.
369 U.S. at 470.
91. Id. at 472-73. The trial court labeled the legal issues as incidental to the equitable issues
and denied a jury trial. McCullough v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 686, 687-88 (E.D. Pa.
1961). The Supreme Court quoted Beacon Theatres and held that
where both legal and equitable issues are presented in a single case, "only under
the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible
procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a
jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims."
That holding. of course, applies whether the trial judge chooses to characterize
the legal issues presented as "incidental" to equitable issues or not.
369 U.S. at 472-73 (quoting Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510-11).
92. Id. at 480.
93. Id. at 477.
94. Id. at 477-78. "The necessary prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit for an equita-
ble accounting . . . is -. .. the absence of an adequate remedy at law." Id. at 478.
95. Id. (citing Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887)).
96. Id. at 478-79.
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involving complicated accounts." In such cases the power of the
trial court under Federal Rule 53(b) to appoint a master to assist
the jury could create a situation in which it would be rare to find
the remedy at law inadequate. 8 The Court warned, however, that
the limitation of trial by jury by the appointment of a master sel-
dom should be made, and only in unusual circumstances.9
The Court in Daiiy Queen therefore acknowledged that not every
case involving complicated business records called for equity juris-
diction. The Court followed the Beacon Theatres approach of deter-
mining the adequacy of legal remedies with respect to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and noted the possibility of referring com-
plex cases to a special master. Finally, the caveat that the cases in
which equity jurisdiction would be appropriate were unusual and
rare virtually eliminated the practice of invoking equity jurisdiction
for mere convenience.
Ross v. Bernard
The approach advanced in Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen was
modified substantially in Ross v. Bernhard.'0 0 Specifically, the
Court held that the right to jury trial in a stockholders' derivative
action applied only to those issues on which the corporation would
have been entitled to a jury trial had it been suing on its own
behalf.'"' The significance of Ross for the purpose of this discussion
lies not in the actual holding but in the new test which the Court
presented for determining the right to trial by jury.
The Court introduced its three-part test in a footnote: "As our
cases indicate, the 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by consid-
ering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions;
second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and
limitations of juries."'"° This new test was characterized as the cor-
97. Id. at 478 n.19 (citing Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 509).
98. Id. at 478. Rule 53(b) provides in part: "A reference to a master shall be the exception
and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the
issues are complicated . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
99. 369 U.S. at 478 n.18; see La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 258 (1957). See
also In re Watkins, 271 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1959).
100. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
101. Id. at 532-33.
102. Id. at 538 n.10 (emphasis supplied). The Court cited no primary authority in this
footnote. The citation to Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963), in the text accompanying
the footnote support- only the classification of the nature of the issue in general and provides
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rect approach in deciding the nature of the issue as either legal or
equitable;0 3 the right to trial by jury thereby was made to depend
on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than on the character
of the entire action.10 4
The Court reiterated its observation in Beacon Theatres that the
Federal Rules were designed to induce purely procedural reforms0 5
and acknowledged the expansion of legal remedies and the resulting
effect on the scope of equity.' 0 Accordingly, the Court did not pro-
pose to overrule or modify Beacon Theatres or Dairy Queen. Finally,
in applying the new test to the facts in Ross, "7 the Court character-
ized the complaint as legal, at least in part, because it alleged
breach of contract and gross negligence, and sought money dam-
ages.'10 The possible effect on the outcome of the case of the new
test's third criterion, the practical abilities and limitations of the
jury, was never addressed.
Thus, the decision in Ross, although attempting to simplify the
question whether the right to trial by jury exists in a particular case,
merely added to the confusion. Although Beacon Theatres and
Dairy Queen limited consideration of the jury's capabilities to rare
and unusual cases, the Ross decision seemed to authorize a case-by-
case inquiry. Furthermore, the Ross opinion provided no guidance
as to the relative weights to be assigned to each of the new test's
three factors or as to how to apply the third criterion to a particular
factual situation. The question that remained was whether satisfac-
tion of the Ross test was mandated by the Constitution as a prere-
quisite to the right to trial by jury.
Ross AS A CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE
The Academic Response
Academic reaction to the Ross test's possible constitutional im-
pact was immediate and mixed. Even the supporters of the test
no direct precedent for the test itself. See Fleming, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Litigation,
72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963).
103. 396 U.S. at 538.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 539-40.
106. Id. at 540 (citing Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 509).
107. Id. at 542.
108. Id. "Under these circumstances it is unnecessary to decide whether the corporation's
other claims are also properly triable to a jury." Id. at 542-43 (citing Dairy Queen).
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could not agree on an interpretation. The test was characterized by
some as a mere affirmance of the historical test' 9 and by others as
a distinct modification of the strict historical approach.""0
The most conservative view was that the third criterion was the
modem equivalent of the common law principle of trying complex
issues of accounting in equity."' On the other-hand, the foremost
proponent of the Ross approach, Professor Fleming James, found
Ross to be evidence of an elastic construction of the historical test
by the Court."' 2 Although Professor James believed that the histori-
cal test probably would survive because of the difficulty in formulat-
ing a new test,"3 he long had espoused a more flexible approach to
the right to jury trials, particularly in view of the effect of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.' To Professor James, Ross repre-
sented a compromise between the historical test and a completely
new approach.1' 5
Conversely, the critics expressed a variety of assessments of the
problems caused by the Ross footnote establishing the three-part
test. The footnote was characterized as "seemingly obscure,""' 6 "a
potential bombshell,"" 7 "problematic,""' "fleeting,""' 9 "sur-
prising,' 20 and "inappropriate. '1 21 Most critics found the Ross test
to be a departure from the traditional historical approach and,
therefore, a threat to the right to a jury trial as preserved by the
109. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D.
199 (1976).
110. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.3 (2d ed. 1977).
111.Kirkham, supra note 109, at 209.
112. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 110, § 8.3, at 360.
113. Id.
114. Id. Professor James argued,
[Tihe historical test of jury-trial right embodied in our constitutions is proba-
bly not well adapted to the merged or united procedures of the present day. It
carries too much of the deadwood of the past. A critical use of history may be
an excellent guide to present problems, but a critical use takes account of
changes in conditions as well as similarities.
Id.
115. Id.
116. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of
Rational Decision Making. 70 Nw. U. L. Rlv. 486, 523 (1975).
117. Id. at 524.
118. Id.
119. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment. 57 MINN. L. lh v.
639, 645 (1973).
120. C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 92, at 454.
121. 5 MOORE's, supra note 1, 38.1119], at 128.23.
1978]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:329
seventh amendment.'22 The opponents argued that the Court im-
pliedly agreed with their view because the test was not applied in
the Ross decision.'1 The footnote was criticized for its lack of cited
authority2  and for the lack of any indication of the weight to be
afforded each factor.'2
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the Ross footnote is the
discretion left to the trial judge. One commentator believed that
this would allow the right to trial by jury to rest on whether the
judge valued sophistication in complex matters or the common
sense approach that jurors could provide. 2 Another author sug-
gested that the very purpose of the jury was to curb judicial discre-
tion, a purpose that would be defeated if the ultimate decision was
left to the judge.' 27 In effect, judicial discretion was encouraged in
an area in which it historically was intended to be minimal. Finally,
the critics noted, a balancing approach was not appropriate for such
a basic constitutional right.
122. Professor Wolfram noted that "[t]he Court's invocation of the 'practical abilities and
limitations of juries' as a criterion for deciding when the seventh amendment requires trial
by jury would suggest, for the first time, that the Court is tantalized by an explicitly func-
tional approach to this seventh amendment question." Wolfram, supra note 119, at 644.
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrIcE commented that the footnote "strikes the present authors as
inappropriate for determining the 'command,' as distinct from the 'influence,' of the Seventh
Amendment." 5 MooRE's, supra note 1, 38.11[9], at 128.23. Similarly, Professor Wright
viewed the third factor as "surprising since it seems to invite a balancing approach to the
right to jury trial, while the accepted learning has been that that balance was already struck
by the Seventh Amendment." C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 92, at 454. Professor Radish con-
nected the third criterion with the common law action for an accounting. He explained, "With
the apparent exception of an action for an accounting, the relative abilities of judge and jury
did not influence the characterization of a case as legal or equitable. Thus, the third portion
of the Ross footnote may have indirectly adopted a balancing test." Redish, supra note 116,
at 524.
123. For example. Professor Wolfram noted that
those who would be disquieted were the Court seriously to consider a functional
approach, . . . [should remember] that the Court did not even attempt in its
opinion to consider whether a jury could better determine the complex corporate
questions involved in shareholder derivative litigation. Standing as it does, thus
alone, this fleeting expression in Ross v. Bernhard of infidelity to the centrality
of the traditional historical test in seventh amendment determinations would
hardly justify an announcement that the historical test has been susperseded
in the federal courts.
Wolfram, supra note 119, at 645. For further discussion of this aspect of Ross, see The
Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HALv. L. REv. 172, 176 n.26 (1970); Note, 81 YALE L.J. 112,
129-30 (1971).
124. Redish. supra note 116, at 523-24.
125. Note, supra note 123, at 129.
126. The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, supra note 123, at 176 n.26.
127. Wolfram, supra note 119, at 644.
JURY TRIAL IN COMPLEX LITIGATION
The Judicial Response
Although the Supreme Court failed to apply the Ross test to the
facts in that case, the implementation of the approach in other jury
trial cases would secure the status of the test as a constitutional
mandate. But not only has the Court failed to reaffirm the Ross
footnote, the decisions in two jury trial cases suggest that ratifica-
tion of the test is unlikely. Curtis v. Loether 21 involved the issue
whether the right to jury trial attached to actions brought under the
fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.121 The Court's
analysis began with a review of the legislative history of Title VIII'30
and continued with a discussion of the history of jury trials in ac-
tions enforcing statutory rights.1 31 The Court concluded that the
action sounded basically in tort,"3 ' thereby reinforcing the historical-
analogy test and not the Ross test.13 3 Likewise, no mention was made
of the Ross test in a second major jury trial decision, Pernell v.
Southall Realty.'34 Instead, the Court again relied on the traditional
historical test.135
Given the Court's failure to utilize Ross' "seemingly obscure"
footnote, the constitutional status of the test remains questionable.
Accordingly, the lower federal courts initially were hesitant to em-
ploy the new approach. For example, the Fourth Circuit virtually
ignored Ross in Tights, Inc. v. Stanley3' and based its decision on
Dairy Queen instead. 3' The court in Tights, Inc. rejected the res-
pondent's argument that "patent cases as a class are inevitably so
complicated as to justify their resolution by equitable accounting
rather than trial.' 13 The Fourth Circuit refused to include cases
potentially too complex and esoteric for a jury to handle within the
128. 415 U.S.- 189 (1974).
129. Id. at 189-90; 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970).
130. 415 U.S. at 191-92.
131. Id. at 193-95.
132. Id. at 195.
133. Ironically, the Seventh Circuit had applied the Ross test to reach the same result.
Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1117-18 (7th Cir. 1972).
134. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
135. Id. at 374-76.
136. 441 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971).
137. Id. at 337-38, 340-44.
138. Id. at 340. "[Tihe Supreme Court has specifically rejected the argument that equity
jurisdiction may be invoked because of the complexity and difficulty of issues of liability as
distinguished from the complexity of accounting damages." Id. at 340-41 (citing United
States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451 (1906)).
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scope of equitable accounting." 9 Moreover, the court noted that the
Supreme Court, and not the lower federal courts, retained the pre-
rogative to expand the scope of equitable accounting; 4 " Ross was
cited to demonstrate that the Supreme Court was unlikely to widen
that scope.''
The first intermediate level federal court to use the test in com-
plex litigation was the Sixth Circuit in Hyde Properties v. McCoy. 142
Hyde Properties was an interpleader action in which one of the
defendants demanded a jury trial.' The Court applied the test
anounced in the Ross footnote to determine the nature of the
issue.14 Although the decision mainly focused on the remedy sought,
the jury's abilities also were examined.4 5 In Hyde Properties, the
primary issue for the jury was whether the corporation was solvent
or involvent; therefore, the determination of the accounting proce-
dures employed was critical.' The court of appeals, agreeing with
the district court that the issues were complex and confusing, con-
cluded that a nonjury trial would be more efficient and just.147 The
court's brief reference to the third criterion provided little guidance
for determining whether the complexity of the issues alone is suffi-
cient to justify invoking equitable jurisdiction.
Similarly, district courts seem to concentrate on the first two
139. Id. at 341.
140. Id. The court concluded that
[ilf the scope of "equitable accounting" is to be expanded to encompass cases
felt to be too complex or esoteric for trial to a jury, we think that expansion must
come from the Supreme Court. We do not construe any language in the Dairy
Queen opinion to sanction this further limitation of the right to jury trial.
Id.
141. Id. at 341 n.11.
142. 507 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1974).
143. Id. at 304.
144. Id. at 305.
145. Id. at 306.
146. Id. The determination of the corporation's solvency or insolvency "involved conflicting
issues of fact concerning accounting procedures used to list the assets and liabilities of the
corporation." Id.
147. Id. The Court reasoned,
In its opinion, the district court acknowledged that "the issues between the
parties were both complex and likely to be confusing in light of the underlying
facts and circumstances .... " We agree with this observation and conse-
quently find as to the third factor that a jury is not especially well-qualified to
dispose of such issues and that a non-jury trial of the issues is both more efficient
and more likely to produce a just result.
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criteria at the expense of the third. For example, in Prudential Oil
Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,"' the district court applied the
Ross test in an action for breach of contract and misappropriation
of trade and business information."' As in Hyde Properties, only one
paragraph of the Prudential Oil opinion was devoted to the third
criterion; however, somewhat more analysis was involved, and the
jury trial demand was granted.8 0
In 1976, the first detailed analysis of the third criterion in a com-
plex case appeared in In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 5,
involving alleged violations of securities laws.1 12 The court, resting
its decision primarily on the third part of the Ross footnote,'5 3
granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiffs jury de-
mand.' 4 Three factors led to the decision: the factual issues, the
complexity of the evidence, and the time involved.' 5 Furthermore,
the third criterion of the Ross footnote was considered definitely "of
constitutional dimensions."' 58 The court viewed this criterion as a
limitation on or an interpretation of the seventh amendment and
detected no conflict with the Federal Rules. 57
Although the court in Jones v. Orenstein55 denied the defendant's
motion to strike the plaintiffs jury demand, its decision was based
exclusively on the Boise Cascade court's interpretation of the third
criterion. 59 Like Boise Cascade, Jones involved issues of securities
law;' 0 the court in Jones, however, classified Boise Cascade as atyp-
ical.'8 ' Although not explicitly determined by the court, the third
criterion apparently was viewed as a constitutional mandate.
148. 392 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), reu'd on other grounds, 546 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1976).
149. Id. at 1020.
150. Id. at 1023. The court commented that Ross suggested "a third consideration worthy
of examination" and then cited Dairy Queen in concluding that the jury was capable of
deciding the issues involved "upon proper instructions from the trial court." Id.
151. 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
152. Id. at 101.
153. Id. at 104.
154. Id. at 105.
155. Id. at 103.
156. Id. at 105.
157. Id.
158. 73 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
159. Id. at 606.
160. Id. at 605.
161. Id. at 606. The court explained that "[i]n the Boise Cascade litigation, the sheer
number of marked documents alone weighed against the advisability of trial by jury." Id.
1978]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:329
In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation,6 2 involving eighteen
lawsuits and about one hundred defendants,'63 was a mammoth
securities litigation. The district court not only adopted the Ross
test to determine whether a case is legal or equitable in nature'64 but
also formulated guidelines for applying the third criterion.' 5 Thus,
the court in U.S. Financial found sufficient constitutional dimen-
sions to the Ross test to warrant the development of guidelines for
its application.
In contrast, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan reverted to the Hyde Properties approach in SEC
v. Associated Minerals, Inc.,' 6 another securities case. Though the
court characterized the Ross test as "sophisticated,"'6 7 the third
criterion was afforded only cursory treatment in the decision to deny
a jury trial.6 8' Having previously determined that both the claims
presented and the remedies sought were equitable in nature, 9 the
court seemed to doubt the relevancy of this inquiry; the right to a
jury trial is not constitutionally guaranteed in suits in equity.70
Therefore, even within the difficult area of securities litigation, the
approaches and results have been inconsistent.
162. 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
163. Id. at 706. The court demonstrated the sheer volume of this litigation in two append-
ices to its opinion, covering over eight pages and listing the cross-complaints and cases that
were consolidated. Id. at 715-23 app.
164. Id. at 710.
165. Id. at 711. The court's guidelines were:
First, although mere complexity is not enough, complicated accounting prob-
lems are not generally amenable to jury resolution.
Second, the jury members must be capable of understanding and of dealing
rationally with the issues of the case.
And third, an unusually long trial may make extraordinary demands upon a
jury which would make it difficult for jurors to function effectively throughout
the trial.
Id.
166. 75 F.R.D. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
167. Id. at 725.
168. Id. at 726.
169. Id.
170. Id. The court expressed this doubt as follows:
Finally, to the extent that a jury's ability to properly decide an action may
be relevant to determining whether the constitutional right to a jury is involved,
the Court believes that the issues of fraud and noncompliance with the registra-
tion provisions of the securities laws presented in this action are indeed complex
and for this reason are not especially suited for resolution by a jury.
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Although the Ross test received inconsistent application in 'the
securities cases with conflicting results, these cases similarly inter-
preted Ross as authorizing a case-by-case analysis of the practical
limitations of juries. However, in Radial Lip Machine, Inc. v. Inter-
national Carbide Corp., 7' a patent infringement case, the district
court found in Ross a test to determine the nature of an entire class
of claims.1 72 Rejecting the securities cases' interpretation, the court
in Radial Lip Machine stated that the only support for the case-by-
case approach was the narrow Dairy Queen exception for compli-
cated accounts. 73 Ruling that the patent infringement action did
not fall within the Dairy Queen exception, the court denied the
motion to strike the jury demand. 7
Most recently, the Ross test was applied in two complex antitrust
cases.' 75 Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc.'76 characterized the
third criterion of the test, directed at the limits on jurors' abilities,
as a restatement of equity's concurrent jurisdiction in complex
cases 77 and denied trial by jury on several grounds.'7 The second
antitrust case, ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 179 was
unique in that the court based its decision on prior experience with
a deadlocked jury and a mistrial."' After a mistrial was declared,
the court, having granted a directed verdict for the defendant, re-
considered the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiffs jury de-
mand in the event of a remand for retrial."'' The court, using the
171. 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
172. Id. at 227. "The three Ross criteria are guides for determining whether a claim typi-
cally has a sufficient quantum of legal elements so that it must be tried to a jury.. . . The
portion of the Ross test which weighs the practical abilities and limitations of juries contem-
plates a general analysis of the problems typically presented by those claims, not a specific
case-by-case analysis of the complexity of the litigation." Id. (citations omitted).
173. Id. 228.
174. Id. at 228-29.
175. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., No. C-73-2238 (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 11,
1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
176. 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
177. Id. at 67.
178. Id. at 71. The court denied trial by jury on grounds of (1) the length of the trial, (2)
the complexity of the relationships among the parties, (3) the sheer size of the litigation, and
(4) the complexity of the accounting procedure involved. Id. at 70. The court rejected the
plaintiff's suggestion that a special master be appointed pursuant to Federal Rule 53. The
court stated thaf "any role that a Special Master might be able to play in this care is so
peripheral that the underlying complexities will necessarily remain." Id.
179. No. C-73-2238 (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 11, 1978).
180. Id., slip op. at 1.
181. Id. at 39.
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third criterion of Ross and relying on personal observations, stated,
"[Tlhe magnitude and complexity of the present lawsuit render it,
as a whole, beyond the ability and competency of any jury to under-
stand and decide rationally ... ."I" The courts in both Bernstein
and ILC Peripherals, therefore, proceeded on the assumption that
satisfaction of the Ross test was a constitutional prerequisite.
These cases demonstrate that although that portion of the Ross
test regarding the practical limitations and abilities of juries has
been applied in complex litigation, it has not received universal
acceptance. To the extent that Ross seems to authorize a case-by-
case analysis, courts should use the test cautiously because of its
questionable constitutional status.
The Supreme Court stated in Dairy Queen that the case in which
the remedy at law could be found to be inadequate would be rare.'83
Furthermore, in Beacon Theatres, the Court noted that because no
party was guaranteed a nonjury trial by any constitutional provi-
sion,' 4 the trial court's discretion must be exercised to preserve jury
trial whenever possible.'85 Therefore, superficial treatment of the
third factor in Ross"6 permits the trial judge too much discretion.
If the Ross test is to be used, the courts' analyses should be thorough
and should include A consideration of the improved procedures
available under the Federal Rules. The test for the right to jury trial
remains the adequacy of the remedy at law.' 87 Therefore, absent
further instruction from the Supreme Court, the Ross test should be




The considerations involved in trying to reduce the intricacy of
complex litigation include factors present at every stage of the liti-
gation, beginning with pretrial proceedings. Pretrial discovery
182. Id. at 48.
183. 369 U.S. at 478.
184. 359 U.S. at 510.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Hyde Properties v, McCoy, 507 F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Asso-
ciated Minerals, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 724, 726 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Prudential Oil Corp. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 392 F. Supp. 1018, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
187. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 478, Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 506-10.
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under the Federal Rules,' especially the provision for admissions,'"9
can be used to narrow the issues in the suit,'90 thereby limiting the
trial to the facts actually in dispute. These discovery procedures,
however, may be abused by parties asserting a dubious claim.' 9'
This potential for abuse demonstrates the need for responsible dis-
covery, well supervised by the judge or a special master.' 2 Gener-
ally, though, proper use of discovery could narrow the issues before
the jury, thus eliminating some of the major problems facing juries
in complex litigation. This, of course, would require the use of
pretrial conferences'93 to simplify the issues for the jury.' 94
The Court in Dairy Queen stated that reference to a special mas-
ter' 5 was an important method of preserving jury trials in complex
litigation.' 6 Although reference to a master has been rejected in
some cases,'9 7 the courts generally have considered using masters
more frequently in complex cases.'98 This decision must be made
carefully, however, since the Supreme Court commented in Dairy
Queen that "[e]ven this limited inroad upon the right to trial by
jury 'should seldom be made, and if at all onlywhen unusual cir-
cumstances exist.' """ Some commentators have suggested amend-
ing Rule 53 to insure that the unusual circumstances requirement
does not bar the expanded role of mastersm in supervising the dis-
covery process and in expediting complex litigation. 0'
Although the Federal Rules have provided tools to alleviate com-
plexity, the rules concerning compulsory counterclaims,02 permis-
188. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
189. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
190. 5 MOORE'S, supra note 1, 38.25, at 201, See generally 4 id. 26.02[2], at 26.64 to
26.68.
191. Kirkham, supra note 109, at 204.
192. See notes 195-201 infra & accompanying text.
193. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
194. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 714 (S.D. Cal, 1977).
195. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). See generally 5 MooRE's, supra note 1, 38.25, at 201; 5A id.
53.05[2], at 2946-62; Note, 65 YALE L.J. 1057 (1956).
196. 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962).
197. E.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re
U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. at 713.
198. 5A MooRE's, supra note 1, at 2958 n.41.
199. 369 U.S. at 478 n.18 (quoting La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 258 (1957)).
See also In re Watkins, 271 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1959).
200. E.g., 5A MooRE's, supra note 1, at 2958 n.41.
201. See Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
202. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
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sive counterclaims, 23 cross-claims, 24 third-party claims, 25 joinder of
claims, 20 necessary joinder,0 7 and permissive joinder2"' have compli-
cated civil litigation. The Rules include a device for prevention of
such complications through the severance of claims, 09 but severance
increases the amount of time spent in court2 0 and increases the
possibility of inconsistent verdicts.2 1' Consequently, the Federal
Rules relating to multiple parties and multiple claims create a
major problem without suggesting a solution.
The Trial
Because of the disparity between the legal and practical aspects
of a jury trial in complex litigation, the right to trial by jury has
become "the right to an irrational verdict. ' 21 2 The easiest solution
to this problem is within the power of the parties themselves. A
party must make a timely demand in order to secure the right to
trial by jury; the right is not automatic. ' The parties, therefore,
must decide whether their reasons for the jury trial demand out-
weigh the burden on the judicial system. Thus, a means for reducing
complexities that requires no change in the jury system is available,
requiring only responsible decisions by the parties.
The trial itself may be the major problem in complex litigation.
The number of civil suits in federal courts has increased dramati-
cally in recent years, 1 ' and individual trials are becoming more time
203. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
204. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
206. FED. R. Civ. P. 18.
207. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
209. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b); see Berstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 714 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
210. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. at 714.
211. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 70.
212. Id. at 71.
213. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
214. From 1971 to 1976, pending civil cases increased by more than 25,000; complex cases,
especially class actions, increased at the highest rate. Kirkham, supra note 109, at 204-05.
"In the last decade, the number of private antitrust lawsuits filed annually in federal court
has tripled, reaching 1,611 cases in fiscal 1977. The number of federal cases involving securi-
ties, commodities and stock exchanges has gone up even faster. In fiscal 1977, the total was
1,960 cases." Shaffer, Those Complex Antitrust Cases, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1978, at 16 col.
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consuming." ' These changes affect the judicial system, the composi-
tion of the jury, and the jurors themselves. In order to solve these
problems, it may be necessary to abolish juries altogether in com-
plex litigation. Given the preference for jury trials in this country,
however, any such attempts probably will fail.
The preference for jury trials results in prolonged proceedings
which adversely affect the federal judicial system,2 8 a system al-
ready overburdened by the vast number of pending cases. 2 7 During
a long trial, the district court usually will not be assigned new cases,
hence increasing the workloads of the other courts in that district.
211
In addition, a long jury trial increases the expense of judicial admin-
istration.21 1
A lengthy trial also affects the composition of the jury, which the
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 guarantees to be a fair cross
section of the community. 22 The courts, realizing that people nor-
mally cannot spend considerable time away from their jobs, 22'
usually excuse prospective jurors upon a showing of hardship or
inconvenience.2 22 Accordingly, the available jurors often do not have
commercial or business experience, thus depriving the litigants of a
trial before a fair cross section of the community. 22 The courts view
215. Trial lengths in various cases were estimated at four months, Bernstein v. Universal
Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), four to six months, In re Boise Cascade Sec.
Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D. Wash. 1976), and two years, In re U.S. Financial Sec.
Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 713 (S.D. Cal. 1977). Actual trials have lasted five months, ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. V. IBM Corp., No. C-73-2238, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Cal., filed Aug.
11, 1978), and over a year, see Shaffer, supra note 214, at 16, col. 6.
216. See note 214 supra.
217. See generally Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96 (1976);
Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill,
85 HARV. L. Rv. 442 (1971); Note, supra note'123, at 123-26.
218. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., No. C-73-2238, slip op. at 47 (N.D.
Cal., filed Aug. 11, 1978).
219. In the ILC case, a mistrial was declared after a five-month trial, during which the
government paid over $32,000 in jury expenses. Id. See generally Shapiro & Coquillette, supra
note 217.
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970). The Act reads in part: "It is the policy of the United States
that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and
petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or
division wherein the court convenes. . . "Id.
221. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 68-9; In re Boise Cascade Sec.
Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at 104.
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (1970).
223. See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 68; In re Boise Cascade Sec.
Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at 104. See also ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM. Corp., No.
C-73-2238, slip op. at 46-47 (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 11, 1978).
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the lack of a fair cross section as defeating the primary purpose of
the jury, the "determination of facts by impartial minds of diverse
backgrounds." '24 Thus, a long trial's effect on jury composition
weighs akainst the use of a jury in complex litigation, particularly
since individuals with the background and experience for under-
standing the complex issues often are excused from jury duty be-
cause of business inconvenience.
The jury's composition, however, could be improved in two ways.
First, a fair cross section could be achieved by limiting excuses from
jury service because of hardship or inconvenience. ' This measure
must be accompanied by cooperation from employers in compensat-
ing employees for jury duty and allowing for more flexible work
schedules. Second, special juries consisting only of professionals
with business experience, known as "blue-ribbon" juries, could be
authorized. This, however, would require an amendment to the Jury
Selection and Service Act of 1968,226 which was passed to prohibit
blue-ribbon juries.22 The amendment could take the form of an
exception for complex litigation in general or for specific types of
litigation involving antitrust laws or securities regulations. What-
ever the method, the composition of the jury must be altered to
achieve well-reasoned verdicts, and therefore to solve one of the
major problems with jury trials in complex litigation.
The courts also have considered the problem of the effect of a long
trial on the jury itself.21 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of California termed it unconscionable to ask ju-
rors to sit for long periods of time.29 Career advancement and profi-
ciency could be affected, 3 ' and chances of unforeseen personal oc-
currences would increase with the length of time.2Y' Most impor-
224. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at 104; see Bernstein v. Universal
Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
225. See note 222 supra.
226. See note 220 supra.
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(a) (1970). This section was amended specifically to prohibit blue-
ribbon juries. See H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1792, 1795.
228. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., No. C-73-2238 (N.D. Cal. filed
Aug. 11, 1978); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977); In re Boise
Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
229. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. at 713.
230. Id.; In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at 104.
231. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. at 714.
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tantly, problems with interest and attention could impair the jury's
performance. 2
Thus, a lengthy jury trial adversely affects the judicial system,
the litigants' right to a diversified panel of jurors, and the jurors
themselves. Alternatively, a nonjury trial can decrease the impact
on the judicial process and eliminate jury problems. A major advan-
tage in a trial to the court is the judge's experience in commercial
litigation, both in practicess and on the bench.2s4 Since the judge
already is familiar with the pleadings filed,25 opening statements
by counsel can be eliminated, thus shortening trial time. 36 Further-
more, a court trial can be scheduled more flexibly than a jury
trial.s?
During the trial of a complex case, the court has various judicial
tools that are not available in a jury trial. 5 The judge can address
direct questions to witnesses for immediate clarification23 and study
exhibits in depth.2"' Depositions can be admitted directly into evi-
dence without being read aloud. 4' In addition, the judge has the
opportunity to review daily transcripts and selected portions of tes-
timony from the reporter's notes. 22 After the testimony has been
taken in a trial to the court, no more court time is required.243 No
summations are needed, and the judge can take his notes to his
chambers or to his home if he cannot reach a decision immedi-
ately.24 Thus, a trial to the court can be preferable to a jury trial
232. Id. at 711; Kirkham, supra note 109, at 208.
233. Redish, supra note 116, at 505 n.82.
234. In re Boise Cascade Sec, Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at 104; Redish, supra note 116, at
505 n.82.
235. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at 105; Peck, Do Juries Delay
Justice?, 18 F.R.D. 455, 456 (1956).
236. Peck, supra note 235, at 456.
237. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at 105. For example, one court
suggested appointing special masters to review and organize the documentary evidence and
scheduling three days of actual trial and a fourth day for the judge and the masters to review
the evidence presented. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. at 714.
238. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at 104-05. Contra, Jones v. Oren-
stein, 73 F.R.D. 604, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
239. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at 105; Redish, supra note 116, at
505 n.82.
240. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp, at 105.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Peck, supra note 235, at 456.
244. Id.
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with respect to the impact on the judicial system, especially in
terms of court time.
With proper instructions, however, these judicial tools can be
used in a jury trial to assist the jury.245 For example, in a complex
antitrust case, 246 Judge Conti of the Northern District of California
gave instructions that filled ninety pages of the trial transcript and
diagrammed the thought processes the jurors were to employ. 247 The
judge also permitted the jury to take 3,000 exhibits and the trial
transcript into the jury room. 248 In a similar case, the judge not only
provided the jury with guidelines and transcripts249 but also in-
structed the jury before the trial and allowed the jurors to take
notes. 2' " Some commentators question the effectiveness of such in-
structions; no matter how well instructed by the court, a jury cannot
be expected to maintain the interest and attention necessary both
to collate the evidence and to understand it.251 The use of effective,
clear instructions, however, must be considered when weighing the
propriety of a jury trial in complex cases. 252
Post-Trial Motions
The courts, when confronted with a demand for a jury trial,
should consider the possibility of post-trial motions, 2 3 particularly
those for a directed verdict, 254 a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, 25 and a new trial.256 These motions can be granted if the jury's
verdict is clearly erroneous. 257 This factor was examined expressly in
only one of the cases discussed,2 perhaps because these motions are
raised after the trial and after the problems have occurred.
245. See Prudential Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 392 F. Supp. 1018, 1023 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). See generally Shaffer, supra note 214.
246. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., No. C-73-2239 (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 11, 1978).




251. E.g., Kirkham, supra note 109, at 208.
252. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 479.
253. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974).
254. FED. R. Crv. P. 50(a).
255. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
256. FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
257. Jones v. Orenstein, 73 F.R.D. 604, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); cf. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
at 198 (use of Federal Rules 50 and 59 to insure proper verdicts for victims of discrimination).
258. Jones v. Orenstein, 73 F.R.D. at 606.
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The motions that would be most helpful in alleviating problems
with jury trials in complex litigation are actually those made before
and during the trial, such as motions to strike,29 motions for a more
definite statement,'6 motions for judgment on the pleadings, 21' and
motions for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.26 2 Therefore, although post-trial motions must be
considered if an erroneous verdict is possible, motions made before
and during trial, correcting the problems before they occur, would
be more effective.
CONCLUSION
The federal courts should not consider the Ross decision as a
license to strike a jury demand simply upon a finding that the issues
are complex. The strong language in Beacon Theatres and Dairy
Queen regarding the limited application of such a determination,
coupled with the Supreme Court's silence as to the proper applica-
tion of the Ross test, indicate that the test for determining whether
a right to a jury trial exists has not changed since Beacon Theatres.
The basis for equitable jurisdiction remains the inadequacy of the
remedy at law. The advantages of a nonjury trial must be weighed
against the provisions of the Federal Rules to determine the ade-
quacy of the legal remedy. In a close decision, the courts must
recognize the constitutional bias in favor of trial by jury.
The most effective means of preventing problems with jury trials
in complex litigation lie in the parties' capacity to decline trial by
jury. If a jury trial is demanded, however, measures less radical than
the abolition of the jury itself can correct the problems of jury trials
in complex litigation. Limiting excuses from jury duty and authoriz-
ing blue-ribbon juries could insure that the jury reaches a well-
reasoned decision, thus eliminating the problem of irrational ver-
dicts. Effective use of pretrial discovery, motions, jury instructions,
and other judicial tools available through the Federal Rules also can
reduce the complexities. In any event, the importance of the right
to trial by jury generally outweighs the advantages of a trial to the
court in complex cases if an adequate legal remedy exists.
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